Water Pollution Control in Vermont: A System of Effluent Charges by Birmingham, Hobart
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 
Volume 4
1970 
Water Pollution Control in Vermont: A System of Effluent Charges 
Hobart Birmingham 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr 
 Part of the Environmental Law Commons, Legislation Commons, State and Local Government Law 
Commons, and the Water Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Hobart Birmingham, Water Pollution Control in Vermont: A System of Effluent Charges, 4 U. MICH. J. L. 
REFORM 135 (1970). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol4/iss1/9 
 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
WATER POLLUTION CONTROL IN VERMONT:
A SYSTEM OF EFFLUENT CHARGES
I. INTRODUCTION
In the final hours of a three month session, Vermont's legisla-
ture adopted a water pollution control law which imposes fees on
polluters.1 Control of water pollution has been a popular issue in
Vermont-its first comprehensive laws on the subject were
passed in 1949 2 -and this new legislation is designed to be a
major step toward upgrading much of that state's water re-
sources.
3
Increasing industrial and municipal water use has resulted in
such widespread pollution that the traditional private law of ri-
parian rights provides an inadequate remedy to the problem of
unclean water. 4 Consequently, state intervention has become es-
sential to the maintenance of high water quality. 5 There are sev-
eral approaches a state may take to control water quality. The
conventional method is direct state regulation of stream stan-
dards, enforced through effluent standards:6 The state sets quality
standards for specific bodies of water and then regulates or prohi-
bits the discharge of waste effluents in order to maintain the
standards. A second method of state control employs the same
water quality standards, but does not regulate or prohibit waste
discharge. Instead of direct control, a fee is assessed, calculated
so that it will be an incentive to the polluter to reduce its dis-
charge of waste to a point where the water quality will rise to the
desired level. Each polluter is charged according to the amount of
effluent he discharges into the water. This is a system of stream
standards enforced by effluent charges. 7 A third system, also
based on effluent charges,8 does not set a specific standard for
water quality; rather, effluent charges are assessed solely on the
basis of the damage the discharged waste inflicts upon subsequent
'N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1970, §1, at 31, col. 3.
2 V.S. 1949, No. 148, §16.
3 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§901-920 (1949).
See generally A. KNEESE & B. BOWER, MANAGING WATER QUALITY: ECONOMICS,
TECHNOLOGY, INSTITUTIONS 84-89 (1968).
5 Id. at 89-96.
6 1d. at 131-181. The author suggests that there has been a debate about stream
standards vs. effluent standards but that the two ideas really are complementary.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 97-130.
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users. The rationale underlying this approach is that charging the
producer for the damage he causes will result in the most econom-
ically efficient allocation of resources. 9 This third approach, how-
ever, is made impossible under federal law which requires either
the states or the federal government to establish stream standards
for all interstate waters.' 0
II. THE VERMONT BILL
A. Vermont's Approach to Solution
The new Vermont legislation seeks to control pollution through
a confusing hybrid of all the above systems of water management.
The provisions of the new bill provide for the issuance of tem-
porary pollution permits which will allow polluters who cannot
immediately satisfy the terms of the statute additional time to
comply. However under such permits polluters will be required to
pay an effluent charge based upon the amount of waste they put
into the water.12 Notwithstanding this new effluent charge provi-
sion, the essence of the Vermont approach remains a system of
stream classifications enforced by permits directly regulating the
amount of waste discharge.'
3
Vermont's problem is not overwhelming-it certainly lacks the
dramatic severity of the pollution in the Hudson River area.
1 4
Vermont's principal sources of effluents are from the by-products
of the milk and cheese processing plants, the refuse from paper
mills, and granite dust from the washing of granite from the
granite quarries. 15 The sources of pollution are few enough that
the government agency in charge of administering the new law,
the Department of Water Resources, believes it will be fairly easy
to oversee the polluters. 16 Moreover, experience gained by the
department while administering the old law may enable it to
mount a more coherent attack against pollution than is apparent
on the face of the recent enactment. The purpose of this note is to
9 Id.
10 If the state fails to establish stream standards, the federal government will. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1160 (1966).
11 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §912a (1970).
12 Id. §§902, 91 Ia.
'3 Id. §9 12a.
14 Drahos, A Clean-up Folk Festival, 24 CONSERVATIONIST, Oct.-Nov., 1969, at 31;
Atwater, Hope for the Hudson, 23 CONSERVATIONIST, Jun.-Jul., 1969, at 15; Seegar &
Goodman, To Save the Dying Hudson, LOOK, Aug. 26, 1969, at 62.
15 This and a great deal of other information was obtained in interviews with officials of
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describe the important provisions of the new statute and point out
its relative strengths and weaknesses.
B. Water Classification
Stream classifications have been the pattern of Vermont water
legislation since the enactment of the 1949 water pollution law.
That law established four classes of water quality which have
been incorporated into the new law and now range from Class A,
the highest, to Class D, the lowest. Class A consists essentially of
drinking water; 17 Class B, also of high quality, is suitable for
swimming and recreation;18 Class C, a lower grade, is still suitable
for boating and wild life;19 and Class D is basically a residuary
category for the dirtiest, most polluted water. 20 The 1949 law also
provided that all lakes over twenty acres in size weie to be Class
B, while all the other water fell into Classes C and D as deter-
mined by the Water Conservation Board.21 The Water Con-
servation Board was the precursor of the present Water Re-
sources Board, which directs the activities of the Department of
Water Resources. In 1964 the law was strengthened so that all
waters not of Class A or B quality were to be of Class C quality
at the very least. 22 The 1970 Act continued the trend to upgrade
water quality by requiring all water not of Class A quality to be of
Class B quality unless classified otherwise by July 1, 1971.23 This
provision represents one of the most dramatic changes in the new
law. If primarily all Vermont waters are to be of Class A or B
quality, then by definition, the state's waters are required to be
virtually free of pollutants.
C. Enforcement of Classifications
To enforce its water classifications, Vermont has adopted a
system of effluent standards which allows the Department of
Water Resources to prohibit discharges that lower the quality of
receiving waters below the standard desired. Anyone wishing to
discharge even pure water into rivers and streams must file with
the Department of Water Resources a written report indicating an




21 [1949] VT. SESS. LAWS, No. 148, §5. The Water Conservation Board was the
forerunner of the present Water Resources Board which heads the Department of Water
Resources.
22 [1964] VT. SEss. LAWS, No. 37, §903.
' VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §903 (1970).
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intent to discharge and describing the nature of the effluent. 24 An
application for a discharge permit 25 will be granted by the depart-
ment only upon a finding "that the proposed discharge will not
reduce the quality of the receiving waters below the classification
established for them."' 26 The permit specifies "the manner, nature,
volume, and frequency of the discharge permitted." 27
At any given point water quality is a function of variables such
as volume of flow, rate of flow, water temperature, and types of
waste already in the water. As the variables change, the effect of a
discharge will also change. For example, the flow in a stream
during a summer dry spell might be so low that any amount of
waste put into the water would result in severe pollution. How-
ever, when rivers are swollen in the spring large amounts of waste
can be discharged without significantly affecting water quality.
Likewise the rate and volume of flow of a stream can vary with
the amount of water and waste discharged by upstream users of
the water. Consequently, to maintain water quality standards,
effective regulation of discharges requires the ability to make
seasonal, daily, or even hourly adjustments in the amount of
effluents permitted in order to respond to any of the changing
stream conditions. It is currently possible to make such pre-
dictions accurately. 28 For example, it can be estimated that the
flow of water in a stream will equal or exceed a certain minimum
rate eighty percent of the time in a given year. Thus, a permit
based on that minimum rate can be expected to maintain stream
standards for that much of the year. This means under a minimum
rate permit, the permissable discharge will cause the water quality
to fall below the established standard roughly twenty percent of
the time. Consequently, unless the department can include in the
permit a reservation of power to adjust the permissible discharge
in accordance with deteriorating stream conditions, no discharge
permit can be guaranteed to maintain a given water standard.
Conversely, when the flow exceeds the minimum rate, the fixed
permit prohibits the polluters from taking advantage of the in-
creased assimilative capacity of the stream. Thus, a discharge
permit that fixes the nature, volume, and frequency of the dis-
charge would be disadvantageous to the polluter as well as to the




26 Id. §91 la(c).
27 Id. §91 la(d)(1).
28 
A. KNEESE, THE ECONOMICS OF REGIONAL WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT 129-140
(1964).
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permit by requiring it to specify the manner, nature, volume and
frequency of the discharge. However, under the Vermont statute,
the Department has the power to add to the permit "such addi-
tional conditions, requirements, and restrictions as the department
deems necessary to preserve and protect the quality of the receiv-
ing waters." 29 This provision could be interpreted to allow the
Department of Water Resources to issue a permit expressing the
discharge permitted as a function of the variables important to
water quality. In addition the Department of Water Resources has
the power to require a permit holder to properly operate and
maintain "any pollution abatement facility." °30 This broad power,
if combined with the ability to write a flexible discharge permit,
would give the department a comprehensive power over the per-
mit holder. With such tools the department would be well
equipped to undertake the work of maintaining stream quality.
Since the discharge under a permit cannot reduce the quality of
recurring waters below an established level, the definition of "re-
ceiving waters" is important. If interpreted as the waters at the
geographical point where the discharge enters the stream, then
determining the extent that a given discharge pollutes the river
involves a calculation of the quality of the water immediately
before and after the discharge. Even if flexible discharge permits
are included in the Vermont scheme, interpreting "receiving wa-
ters" as the point at which a discharge is released into the water
inevitably leads to inequitable results. For instance: factories X,
Y, and Z, close together along a stream are all dumping amounts
of biodegradable wastes into a stream categorized as Class C.3
1
This results in an "oxygen sag" 32 immediately downstream from
these three plants. The discharge of plants X and Y is not enough
to reduce the standard of the water below Class C; however,
when combined with plant Z's discharge further downstream,
their total discharge reduces the standard to Class D. The equi-
29 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §91 Ia (d)(3) (1970).
30 Id. §911 a (d)(2).
31 Degradable and non-degradable waste is one of the principal distinctions between
types of wastes. Basically degradable wastes, as Kneese says, "are reduced in weight by
the biological, physical, and chemical processes which occur in natural waters." KNEESE &
BOWER, supra note 4, at 14. Bio-degradable wastes are those whose weight is reduced by
biological processes and is a major source of water pollution. Non-degradable wastes, on
the other hand, "are usually diluted and may be changed in form, but they are not
appreciably reduced in weight in the receiving water." Id. at 14. For a genera' discussion
of this see KNEESE & BOWER, supra note 4, at 13-30.
32 "Oxygen sag" results when wastes are decomposed by bacteria in the water, con-
suming large amounts of oxygen and thereby lessening oxygen content of the river in the
area downstream from the discharge. This oxygen sag is one of the most common kinds of
water pollution, but if the discharge is not too large the wastes are absorbed by the stream,
and the oxygen level rises again further downstream.
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table solution would be to require all three plants to reduce their
discharge proportionately to a level where Class- C standards can
be maintained. However, if we interpret "receiving waters" as the
point where the discharge flows into the water, plants X and Y
could argue that since the standard was not lowered at the place
where their waste was deposited, they are not responsible for
lowering the water's quality. They can contend that plant Z is
responsible for the pollution which lowers the standard. In fact,
all three factories have contributed to the pollution of the river;
only plant Z, however, contributed that marginal amount of pollu-
tion which reduced the quality below the minimum established
standards.
In the case of non-degradable wastes, 33 the problem becomes
even more extreme. Chemical effluents from factory L could be
carried a hundred miles downstream before it combined with
effluents from factory M in a way that lowered water quality
below the desired standard. To require factory M to bear the full
cost of water treatment or reduced production is unfair, when in
fact both factories are responsible for lowering the water quality.
To reach an equitable result, "receiving waters" should be
interpreted to mean the water along the entire length of the
stream. Thus the effect of any discharge on the water would have
to be calculated not only in terms of the discharges already in the
water, but also in terms of any source of pollution the discharge
will encounter in its movement downstream. There is some au-
thority in Vermont for interpreting "receiving waters" as an entire
stream system. The 1949 law3 4 stated that the Water Con-
servation Board could take action "against any person who per-
mits waste of such kind or quantity to enter such stream as by
itself or in combination with wastes of other sources reduces the
water below the classification set...,"3 5 (emphasis added). The
phrase "other source," was interpreted by the department to
mean either an upstream or downstream sources.3 6 Although this
section has been repealed by the extensive 1970 revision of the
statute, it would remain consistent with that prior approach to
define "receiving waters" as the waters of the entire stream basin.
As an adjunct to the broad discretionary power the Water
Resources Board possesses regarding the classification of water
and the issuance of discharge permits, the Board also may sue in
chancery courts for a broad range of remedies, including the
33 See supra note 31.
34 [19491 VT. SESS. LAWS, No. 148, §,16.
35 Id. §909.
36 Obtained in interview with an official of the Department of Water Resources.
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assessment of compensatory and punitive fines.3 7 Refusal to obey
an order or to comply with the terms of a permit can result in fines
up to $10,000 per day and imprisonment up to five years.38
The solution to water pollution problems, however, does not lie
in governmental decrees and draconian punishments. Water quali-
ty is valuable, but so too are the jobs and products that are
created by polluting industries. While the goal of returning
streams, lakes, and rivers to the purity of their natural state is an
attractive one, the character of our economy is such that in-
dustrial interests must be considered when formulating pollution
control programs. Recognizing this need, Vermont has introduced
two methods of balancing these two conflicting interests.
D. Balancing Interests Under Vermont's Law
The law provides that the Water Resources Board will place
bodies of water in classes other than A or B before July 1, 197 1.
Only those waters still unclassified as of next July will be put into
Class B. 39 Persons or municipalities who feel "they suffer in-
justice or inequity as a result of the classification of any waters"
may petition the Water Resources Board to hold hearings, or the
Board may hold them on its own motion.40 Such hearings are now
being held. In this work the Board is assisted by a Classification
Advisory Council which consists of certain inhabitants of a drain-
age area, including at least one representative of industry. 41 If the
Board finds "the established classification is contrary to the public
interest it may, by order, reclassify ... such waters to a higher or
lower classification."-
42
The many factors to be considered by the Board in determining
what is in the "public interest" are indicated in the statute.43
These considerations suggest that the classification procedure
should be used in terms of an overall plan for water quality
control. If thus applied, the classification procedure could be used
to lay the foundation for an entire drainage area system. How-
ever, this section could also be the weak point of the entire
statute. If this power is used to favor industrial and municipal
pressure groups, and if classifications to Class C and D occur
frequently, Vermont's new law will have very little effect on water
quality.
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Thus far, the department seems to be using the lower classifica-
tions sparingly. No waters are being denominated as Class D. As
of September 1970, twenty-five of a total thirty-six drainage ba-
sins had been classified, and the department was estimating that
less than ten percent of the waters of the state would be design-
ated as Class C when the law goes into effect in July
1971. 4 4 Furthermore, these Class C zones will primarily consist
of one or two mile stretches of water immediately downstream
from a municipal or large industrial polluter. The discharges are
eventually to be limited to amounts of biodegradable waste small
enough to be absorbed by the stream with the Class C zone.
45
The Water Resources Department may utilize another device
enumerated in the Vermont law to balance the need for clean
water against the economic encumbrance control places upon the
polluter: the Department may grant temporary pollution permits,
which give the polluter additional time to comply with the new
water quality standards. 46 If a polluter cannot qualify for a dis-
charge permit because his discharge lowers the quality of water
from one class to another, he must apply for a temporary pollution
permit. If the applicant meets several specified conditions, the
Department may issue him such permit. These prerequisites are:
(1) he does not qualify for a discharge permit; 47 (2) he is design-
ing, constructing, or researching waste treatment facilities; 48 (3)
he needs time to continue polluting beyond July 1, 1971 ; 49and (4)
there are no reasonable alternative methods of waste disposal
other than discharging it into a stream. 50 In addition, he must also
show that extreme hardship will result if a pollution permit is not
issued, that the public benefits from his use of the water, and that
his discharge will not be unreasonably destructive of water qual-
ity. 5
1
The breadth of interpretation possible under any one of these
conditions places the issuance of a permit almost totally within
the department's discretion. However, departmental decisions are
appealable to the Board and to the chancery court.
52
The temporary permit resembles the discharge permit to the
44 Obtained in interview with an official of the Department of Water Resources.
5 Id.
46 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §912a (1970).
47 Id. §9 l2a(c)( I).
48 Id. §9 12a(c)(2).
49 Id. §912a(c)(3).
50 Id. §9 12a(c)(4).
51 Id. §9 12a(c)(4)-(7).
52 Id. §§914a, 915. In an interview with an official of the Department of Water Re-
sources it was disclosed that the Department expects to be issuing permits to most of the
large number of applicants who have applied.
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extent that it specifies the discharge permitted, the construction of
abatement facilities, and the reservation by the department of the
power to attach other conditions as it sees fit. Thus, the tempo-
rary permit may suffer from the same inflexibility as the discharge
permit. Unlike the discharge permit, however, the holder of a
temporary pollution permit will be required to pay a fee based on
the amount of effluent he discharges. In effect, then, the statute
creates a system of effluent charges which are levied in con-
nection with the temporary pollution permit.
The effluent charge is the result of several ideas, one of which
is that use of water should be paid for like most other com-
modities. The Vermont law recognizes this when it says, "the
authorized discharge ... represents an expropriation of a valuable
public natural resource. . . . -5 A second related rationale for the
effluent charge is that the cost of production and the price of
goods should accurately reflect their actual cost to society.54 For
example, assume that pollution of water is a by-product of a
certain paper mill process. This pollution causes damage down-
stream to other users of the water (i.e., a fishing business). How-
ever, since pollution of the water costs nothing, the price of paper
does not accurately reflect its true production cost to society. If a
paper manufacturer is charged to the extent his pollution damages
others, on the other hand, he will have to raise his prices to meet
adequately the cost of the damage. This represents reallocation of
the cost of the resource back to the manufacturer who originally
used the water at no cost. A parity between cost to society and
cost to the manufacturer is important to a free market economy if
society is going to make correct decisions on the optimum use of
natural resources through the market place. 55 Theoretically, if the
price of paper increases after effluent charges are imposed, less
paper will be sold, less paper will be manufactured, and less
pollution will then be discharged into the river. Recognizing this
theory as the basis for effluent charges, the Vermont statute
directs the Board in setting the charge, "to approximate in eco-
nomic terms the damage done to other users of the waters, both
private users and the general public. "56
Effluent charges should be set so that they operate as a direct
incentive to the polluter to reduce its waste discharges. Assuming
profit maximization is the goal of the businessman, he will make
5- VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §912a(e)(1)(1970).
54 A. KNEESE & B. BOWER, supra note 4, at 75-78.
55 Id.
56 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 §912a(e)(2)(1970).
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changes in production necessary to reduce waste or treat wastes
in order to minimize his effluent charges.
57
While the incentive motive is the principle purpose for the
effluent charges in the Vermont statute,58 an additional advantage
of the charges is that they produce revenue which can be used to
improve water quality. 59 For instance, a business may calculate
that it is cheaper to pay the charges than to build extensive and
expensive abatement facilities. Several firms along a river basin
may reach a similar decision. Though it is in fact cheaper for all
the firms to pay the charges on an individual basis, the revenue
gained from all these firms together might be sufficient to operate
a single waste treatment facility that would treat all the waste
material at some point downstream. Despite the fact that there
would be areas of a stream that were polluted, large areas could
be kept clean and usable. Finally, the revenues could make the
department self-sufficient and enable it to wage a coherent and
comprehensive attack on water pollution.
E. Criticism of Vermont's Temporary Pollution Permits
Effluent charges can be used in two basic ways. If the goal is
primarily the reduction of waste, then the inhibiting effect of the
charge on pollution may be emphasized by setting the charge at a
level that is designed to cause substantial waste reduction.6" On
the other hand, if the goal is an equitable and efficient allocation of
resources, then the rate should be set to charge the user an
amount equivalent to the cost of the discharge to the society as a
whole. 61 The same charge will, of course, operate both to reduce
pollution and reallocate cost. However, depending on which of
these uses is considered more important, the way in which the
charge is calculated will be quite different.
57 As a matter of theory he will reduce wastes or treat wastes until he reaches the point
at which it becomes more expensive to treat his waste than it is to pay the charge. In some
industries it may be less expensive to pay the charge rather than to reduce pollution at all,
and in another industry it might be cheaper to eliminate the pollution altogether than to pay
a charge. This is the equitable feature of the effluent charge. In the example in the text,
supra, imagine that factories X, Y, and Z are producing equivalent amounts of waste. Plant
X, for instance, can reduce its waste by ninety percent before it becomes cheaper to pay
the charge. Plant Y on the other hand may reach that point after reducing its waste by fifty
percent, and Plant Z after only eliminating ten percent. Although the reduction in waste is
not the same, the cost of paying the charge added to the cost of reducing waste will be
roughly equivalent for all three plants.
58 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §912a(e)(l)(1970).
5 The Vermont statute in §912a(e)( I) only partially recognizes this feature of the
effluent charge. It states that "the charges are not imposed for revenue purposes ... (they)
shall be used solely for purposes of water quality management and pollution control." The
statutes failure to authorize the department to construct abatement facilities restricts their
use for controlling water pollution.
60 A. KNEESE & B. BOWER, supra note 4, at 135- 139.
61 Id. at 75-84.
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The primary purpose of the Vermont statute is to provide
polluters with the incentive to reduce their waste.62 Logically,
then, the effluent charge should be designed to complement Ver-
mont's stream standards system. Effluent charges can be used in
place of direct regulation to achieve specific levels of water quali-
ty in two ways. First the charge may be set high enough to cause
substantial reduction in the amount of effluents discharged into a
stream. Second, the revenue from the charge may be used by the
government to finance treatment of wastes. 63 If this goal is em-
phasized, the resulting cost of water may not equal the cost of the
discharge to society as a whole, but at least limited reallocation of
costs to the user would nonetheless be an important secondary
effect of such a charge. 64 Studies of the Delaware River Basin
have shown that effluent charges used in this way can be an
effective and inexpensive method of enforcing stream standards. 65
To complement its existing stream standards system, Ver-
mont's effluent charge should be set to achieve the desired stan-
dard by calculating how much a given charge will reduce pollution
and raise revenue. Unfortunately, Vermont's statute does not
calculate charges in this fashion. 66 Instead it specifies that the
charge be calculated to approximate damages to downstream
users. This represents an attempt to equate the cost to the up-
stream user with the damages to downstream user. Such an ap-
proach best serves a system which has as its chief goal the
efficient allocation of resources through reallocation of cost-not
a system whose goal is high water quality standards. 67 The in-
consistency within the language of the effluent charge section,
which, on the one hand, says Vermont is most concerned with
giving an incentive to polluters but, on the other, directs the
charge be set with the goal of reallocation of cost in mind, clouds
the entire water management picture.
Although charges primarily designed to reallocate costs could
effectively serve to reduce pollution, such a result would be large-
ly accidental. Vermont intends to issue a large number of tem-
porary permits which will impose an effluent charge.68 If the
charge is computed as directed by the statute, Vermont will in
large measure be operating an effluent charge system with goals
inconsistent with those found in the basic stream standards ap-
62 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §912a(e)(l)(1970).
63A. KNEESE & B. BOWER, supra note 4, at 135-138, 173-179.
rId. at 159.
65 d. at 158-164.
66 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §912a(b)(2)(1970).
67 A. KNEESE B. BOWER, supra note 4, at 134-139.
61 Obtained in an interview with an official of the Department of Water Resources.
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proach. This may work to improve Vermont's water quality, but it
in effect nullifies a large part of the statute.
Another troubling characteristic of the statute is that the
effluent charge is viewed as only a temporary, interim solution to
the problem of improving water quality. Once stream standards
reach A and B levels, the statute suggests that Vermont will again
rely upon effluent standards, not effluent charges, to maintain high
water quality.6 9 If the effluent charges were to be employed per-
manently, it would be unnecessary to ever lower the stream
classification for the benefit of pollution.70 Since the effluent
charge system allows discharges if the polluter pays as he pol-
lutes, there is no need to permit cost-free pollution. Reclassifica-
tion to lower standards, which allows pollution at no cost, re-
moves the incentive for waste reduction and produces no revenue.
The abandonment of the effluent charge system for the reclas-
sification procedure could well be the weakest point of the statute.
Waters immediately downstream from most polluters in Vermont
have already been reclassified as class C, 7 1 but fortunately, this
represents less than ten per cent of the waters of the entire state.
72
If the Vermont approach were followed by a state with more
significant water quality control problems, however, the per-
centage of waters in class C and class D would be much higher.
On the other hand, a fully utilized system of effluent charges could
allow all streams to remain in class B by creating an economic
incentive for the manufacturer to cease, or at least significantly
reduce, his water pollution.
III. CONCLUSION
The Vermont statute attempts to combine two different sys-
tems of water management: the 1949 provisions for stream and
effluent standards, and the 1970 provisions for effluent charges.
How well this dual system will function is presently uncertain.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the new statute not only creates new
problems but leaves old problems unresolved. For instance, the
traditional problem of failing to define receiving waters is carried
over into the 1970 law. In addition, the new statute misconstrues
the goals of the effluent charge by viewing the charge in terms of
69 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §912a(e)(I)(1970).
70 For a discussion of the advantages of an efficient charge system, See A. KNEESE &
B. BOWER, supra note 4, at 315- 3 19.70 See discussion of reclassification accompanying notes 39-42, supra.
71 Obtained in an interview with an official of the Department of Water Resources.72 Id.
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economic damage to the downstream user rather than as a means
of controlling pollution to achieve the standards established under
the statute. 73 Because of these problems, the Vermont statute falls
short of serving as a model approach to water pollution control.
- Hobart Birmingham
73 If federal law did not require a system of stream standards, then of course Vermont
could write a system of effluent charges not based on stream standards. See note 10 supra.
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